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Abstract
Biometric discretization extracts a binary string from a set of real-valued features per user. This representative string
can be used as a cryptographic key in many security applications upon error correction. Discretization performance
should not degrade from the actual continuous features-based classification performance significantly. However,
numerous discretization approaches based on ineffective encoding schemes have been put forward. Therefore, the
correlation between such discretization and classification has never been made clear. In this article, we aim to
bridge the gap between continuous and Hamming domains, and provide a revelation upon how discretization
based on equal-width quantization and linearly separable subcode encoding could affect the classification
performance in the Hamming domain. We further illustrate how such discretization can be applied in order to
obtain a highly resembled classification performance under the general Lp distance and the inner product metrics.
Finally, empirical studies conducted on two benchmark face datasets vindicate our analysis results.
1. Introduction
Explosion of biometric-based cryptographic applications
(see e.g. [1-12]) in the recent decade has abruptly aug-
mented the demand of stable binary strings for identity
representation. Biometric features extracted by most
current feature extractors, however, do not exist in bin-
ary form by nature. In the case where binary processing
is needed, biometric discretization becomes necessary in
order to transform such an ordered set of continuous
features into a binary string. Note that discretization is
referred to as a process of ‘binarization’ throughout this
article. The general block diagram of a biometric discre-
tization-based binary string generator is illustrated in
Figure 1.
Biometric discretization can be decomposed into two
essential components: biometric quantization and fea-
ture encoding. These components are governed by a sta-
tic or a dynamic bit allocation algorithm, determining
whether the quantity of binary bits allocated to every
dimension is fixed or optimally different, respectively.
Typically, given an ordered set of real-valued feature
elements per identity, each single-dimensional feature
space is initially quantized into a number of non-over-
lapping intervals according to a quantization fashion.
The quantity of these intervals is determined by the cor-
responding number of bits assigned by the bit allocation
algorithm. Each feature element captured by an interval
is then mapped to a short binary string with respect to
the label of the corresponding interval. Eventually, the
binary output from each dimension is concatenated to
form the user’s final bit string.
Apart from the above consideration, information
about the constructed feature space for each dimension
is stored in the form of helper data to enable reproduc-
tion of the same binary string for the same user. How-
ever, it is required that such helper data, upon
compromise, should neither leak any helpful informa-
tion about the output binary string, nor that of the bio-
metric feature itself.
In general, there are three aspects that can be used in
assessing a biometric discretization scheme:
(1) Performance: Upon extraction of distinctive fea-
tures, it is important for a discretization scheme to
preserve the significance of real-valued feature ele-
ments in the Hamming domain in order to maintain
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the actual classification performance. A better
scheme usually incorporates a feature selection or
bit allocation process to ensure only reliable feature
components are extracted or highly weighted for
obtaining an improved performance.
(2) Security: Helper data upon revelation must not
expose any crucial information which may be of
assistance to the adversary in obtaining a false
accept. Therefore, the binary string of the user
should contain adequate entropy and should be
completely uncorrelated to the helper data. Gener-
ally, entropy is a measure that quantifies the
expected value of information contained in a binary
string. In the context of biometric discretization, the
entropy of a binary string is referred to as the sum
of entropy of all single-dimensional binary outputs.
With the probability pi of every binary output i Î {1,
... S} in a dimension, the entropy can be calculated
as l = −∑si=1 pilog2pi . As such, the probability pi
will be reduced when the number of outputs S is
increased, signifying higher entropy and security
against adversarial brute force attack.
(3) Privacy: A high level of protection needs to be
exerted against the adversary who could be inter-
ested in all user-specific information other than the
verification decision of the system. Apart from the
biometric data applicable for discretization, it is
important that unnecessary yet sensitive information
such as ethnic origin, gender and medical condition
should also be protected. Since biometric data is
inextricably linked to the user, it can never be reis-
sued or replaced once compromised. Therefore,
helper data must be uncorrelated to such
information in order to defeat any adversary’s priv-
acy violation attempt upon revealing it.
1.1 Related works
Biometric discretization in the literature can generally
be divided into two broad categories: supervised and
unsupervised discretization (discretization that makes
use of class labels of the samples and discretization that
does not, respectively).
Unsupervised discretization can be sub-categorized
into threshold-based discretization [7-9,11]; equal-width
quantization-based discretization [12,13]; and equal-
probable quantization-based discretization [5,10,14-16].
For threshold-based discretization, each single-dimen-
sional feature space is segmented into two intervals
based on a prefixed threshold. Each interval is labeled
with a single bit ‘0’ or ‘1’. A feature element that falls
into an interval will be mapped to the corresponding 1-
bit output label. Examples of threshold-based discretiza-
tion schemes include Monrose et al.’s [7,8], Teoh et al.’s
[9] and Verbitsky et al.’s [11] scheme. However, deter-
mining the best threshold could be a hurdle in achieving
optimal performance. On top of that, this discretization
scheme is only able to produce a 1-bit output per fea-
ture dimension. This could practically be insufficient in
meeting the current entropy requirement (indicating the
level of toughness against brute force attacks).
On the other hand, the unsupervised equal width
quantization-based discretization [12,13] partitions each
single-dimensional feature space into a number of non-
overlapping equal-width intervals during quantization in
accordance with the quantity of bits required to be
extracted from each dimension. These intervals are
labeled with binary reflected gray code (BRGC) [17] for
Figure 1 A biometric discretization-based binary string generator.
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encoding, where both of which require the number of
constructed intervals to be of a power of 2 in order to
avoid loss of entropy. Based on the equal-width quanti-
zation and the BRGC encoding, Teoh et al. [13] have
designed a user-specific equal-width quantization-based
dynamic bit allocation algorithm that assigns different
number of bits to each dimension based on an intra-
class variation measure. Equal width quantization does
not incur privacy issue. However, it could not offer
maximum entropy since the probability of every quanti-
zation output in a dimension is rarely equal. Moreover,
the width of quantization intervals can be easily affected
by outliers.
The last subcategory of unsupervised biometric discre-
tization, known as equal-probable quantization-based
discretization [14] segments each single-dimensional fea-
ture space into multiple non-overlapping equal-probable
intervals, whereby every interval is constructed to encap-
sulate an equal portion of background probability mass
during quantization. As a result, the constructed inter-
vals are of different widths if the background distribu-
tion is not uniform. BRGC is used for encoding.
Subsequently, two efficient dynamic bit allocation
schemes have further been proposed by Chen et al. in
[15] and [16] based on equal-probable quantization and
BRGC encoding where the detection rate (genuine
acceptance rate) [15] as well as area under FRR curve
[16] is used as the evaluation measure for bit allocation.
Tuyls et al. [10] and Kevenaar et al. [5] have used a
similar equal-probable discretization technique but the
bit allocation is limited to at most one bit per dimen-
sion. However, a feature selection technique is incorpo-
rated in order to identify reliable components based on
the training bit statistics [10] or a reliability function [5]
so that unreliable dimensions can be eliminated from
the overall bit extraction and the discretization perfor-
mance can eventually be improved. Equal probable
quantization offers maximum entropy. However, infor-
mation regarding the background pdf of every dimen-
sion needs to be stored so that exact intervals can be
constructed during verification. This may pose a privacy
threat [18] to the users.
On the other hand, supervised discretization
[1,3,14,19] potentially improves classification perfor-
mance by exploiting the genuine user’s feature distribu-
tion or the user-specific dependencies to extract
segmentations which are useful for classification. In
Chang et al.’s [1] and Hao-Chan’s scheme [3], single-
dimensional interval defined by [μj - ksj, μj + ksj] (also
known as the genuine interval) is first tailored for the
Gaussian user pdf (with mean μj and standard deviation
sj) of the genuine user with a free parameter k. The
remaining intervals of the same width are then con-
structed outwards from the genuine interval. Finally, the
boundary intervals are formed by the leftover widths. In
fact, the number of bits extractable from each dimen-
sion relies on the relative number of formable intervals
in that dimension and is controllable by k. This scheme
uses direct binary representation (DBR) for encoding.
Chen et al. proposed a similar discretization scheme
[14] except that BRGC encoding is adopted; the genuine
interval is determined by the likelihood ratio pdf; and
the remaining intervals are constructed equal-probably.
Kumar and Zhang [19] employed an entropy-based
quantizer to reduce class impurity/entropy in the inter-
vals through recursively splitting every interval until a
stopping criterion is met. The final intervals will be
resulted in such a way that majority samples enclosed
within each interval would belong to a specific identity.
Despite being able to achieve a better classification
performance than the unsupervised approaches, a criti-
cal problem with these supervised discretization
schemes is the potential exposure of the genuine mea-
surements or the genuine user pdf, since the con-
structed intervals serve as a clue at which the user pdf
or measurements could be located to the adversary. As
a result, the number of possible locations of user pdf/
genuine measurements might be reduced to the amount
of quantization intervals in that dimension, thus poten-
tially facilitating malicious privacy violation attempt.
1.2 Motivations and contributions
Past research attention was mostly devoted to proposing
discretization schemes with new quantization techniques
without realizing the effect of encoding towards the dis-
cretization performance. This can be seen from the
recent revelation of inappropriateness of DBR and
BRGC for feature encoding in classification [20],
although they were the most commonly seen encoding
schemes for multi-bits discretization in the literature
[1,3,12-16]. For this reason, the performance of multi-
bits discretization schemes remain to be a mystery when
it comes to linking the classification performance in the
Hamming domain (discretization performance) with the
relative performance in the continuous domain (classifi-
cation performance of continuous features). To date, no
explicit study has been conducted to resolve such an
ambiguity.
A common goal of discretization is to convert real-
valued features into a binary string which at least pre-
serve the actual classification performance without sig-
nificantly compromising the security and privacy
aspects. To achieve this, it is important that appropriate
quantization and encoding schemes have to be adopted.
A new encoding scheme known as linearly separable
subcode (LSSC) has lately been proposed [20]. With
this, features can be encoded much more efficiently with
LSSC than with DBR or BRGC. Since combining it with
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an elegant quantization scheme would produce satisfac-
tory classification results in the Hamming domain, we
adopt the unsupervised equal-width quantization
scheme in our analysis due to its simplicity and its less
susceptibility against privacy attacks. However, a lower
entropy could be achieved when the class distribution is
not uniform (with respect to the equal-probable quanti-
zation approach). This shortage can simply be tackled
by utilizing a larger number of feature dimensions or by
allocating a larger quantity of bits to each dimension to
compensate such entropy loss.
It is the objective of this article to extend the work of
[20] to justify and analyze the deterministic discrete-to-
binary mapping behavior of LSSC encoding; as well as
the approximate continuous-to-discrete mapping beha-
vior of equal-width quantization when quantization
intervals in each dimension are substantial. We reveal
the essential correspondence of distance between the
Hamming domain and the rescaled L1 domain for an
equal-width quantization and LSSC encoding-based
(EW + LSSC) discretization. We further generalize this
fundamental correspondence to Lp distance metrics and
inner product-based classifiers to obtain desired perfor-
mance resemblances. These important resemblances in
fact open up possibility of applying powerful classifier in
the Hamming domain such as binary support vector
machine (SVM) without having to suffer from a poorer
discretization performance with reference to the actual
classification performance.
Empirically, we justify the superiority of LSSC over
DBR and BRGC and the aforementioned performance
resemblances in the Hamming domain by adopting face
biometric as our subject of study. Note that such experi-
ments could also be conducted using other biometric
modalities, as long as the relative biometric features can
be represented orderly in the form of a feature vector.
The organization of this paper is described as follows.
In the next section, equal-width quantization and LSSC
encoding are described as a continuous-to-discrete map-
ping and a discrete-to-binary mapping, respectively, and
both mapping functions are derived. These mappings
are then combined to reveal the performance resem-
blance of EW + LSSC discretization to that of the
rescaled L1 distance-based classification. In Section 3,
proper methods to extend basic performance resem-
blance of EW + LSSC discretization to that of different
metrics and classifiers are described. In section 4,
approximate performance of EW + LSSC discretization
with respect to L1 distance-based classification perfor-
mance is experimentally justified. Results showing the
resemblances of altered EW + LSSC discretization to
the performance of several different distance metrics/
classifier are presented. Finally, several insightful con-
cluding remarks are drawn in Section 5.
2. Biometric discretization
For binary extraction, biometric discretization can be
described as a two-stage mapping process: Each segmen-
ted feature space is first mapped to the respective index
of a quantization interval; subsequently, the index of
each interval is mapped to a unique n-bit codeword in a
Hamming space. The overall mapping process can be
mathematically described by
bdid = g(i
d) = g(f (vd)) (1)
where vd denotes a continuous feature, id denotes a
discrete index of the interval, bdid denotes a short binary
string associated to id, f:ℝ ® ℤ denotes a continuous-to-
discrete map and g:ℤ ® {0, 1}n denotes a discrete-to-
binary map. Note that a superscript d is used for speci-
fying the dimension to which a variable belongs and it is
by no means of being an integer power. We shall define
both these functions in the following subsections.
2.1 Continuous-to-discrete mapping f(·)
A continuous-to-discrete mappingf(·) is achieved
through applying quantization to a continuous feature
space. Recall that an equal-width quantization divides a
one-dimensional feature space evenly in forming the
quantization intervals and subsequently maps each
interval-captured background probability density func-
tion (pdf) to a discrete index. Hence, the probability
mass pdid associated with each index i
d precisely repre-
sents the probability density captured by the interval







d ∈ {0, 1, ..., Sd − 1} (2)





denote the upper and
lower boundary of interval with index id in the d-th
dimension, and Sd denotes the number of constructed
intervals in the d-th dimension. Conspicuously, the
resultant background pmf is an approximation of the
original pdf upon the mapping.
Suppose that a feature element captured by an interval
int did with an index i
d is going to be mapped to a fixed
point within such an interval. Let cdid be the fixed point
in int did to which every feature element v
d
idjd that falls
within the interval has to be mapped, where idÎ{0,1, ...
Sd - 1} denotes the interval index and jd Î {1,2 ...}
denotes the feature element index. The distance of vdidjd
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from cdid is
εdid,jd =
∣∣∣vdid ,jd − Cdid
∣∣∣ ≤ max{intdid(max) − cdid , cdid − intdid(min)} = εdid,jd(max). (3)
Suppose now we are to match each index id of the Sd
intervals with the corresponding cdid through some scal-
ing sˆ and translation tˆ :
cdid = sˆ
d(id + tˆd) for id = {0, Sd − 1}. (4)
To make sˆd and tˆd globally derivable for all intervals,
it is necessary to keep distance between cdid and c
d
id +1
constant for every id Î {0, Sd - 2}. In order to preserve
such a distance between any two different intervals, cdid
in every interval should, therefore, take identical dis-
tance from its corresponding intd
id(min)
. Without loss of







for id = {0, Sd − 1}. (5)
With this, the upper bound of distance of vdidjd from c
d
id
upon mapping in (3) becomes
εdid,jd ≤ intdid(max) − cdid = cdid − intdid(min)} = εdid,jd(max). (6)
To obtain the parameters sˆd and tˆd , we normalize
both feature and index spaces to (0, 1) and shift every
normalized index id by
1
2Sd
to the right to fit the











(id + 0.5). (8)
Thus, sˆd =
int dSd−1(max) − int d0(min)
Sd
and tˆd = 0.5 .
Combining results from (3), (4) and (8), the continu-
ous-to-discrete mapping functionf(·) can be written as





(vdid ,jd − sˆdtˆ − εdid,jd) for vdid,jd ≥ cdid
1
sˆd
(sˆdtˆ − vdid,jd − εdid,jd) for vdid,jd ≥ cdid
(9)
Suppose we are to compute a L1 distance between








2 ∈ [0, Sd − 1], jd1, jd2 ∈ {1, 2...} in the d-th dimen-
sional continuous feature space, and the relative distance
between the corresponding mapped elements in the d-th
dimensional discrete index space, then it is easy to find




∣∣∣− ∣∣∣cdid2,jd2 − cdid1,jd1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2εdid jd(max). (10)
From (4), this inequality becomes
0 ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣vdid2,jd2 − vdid1,jd1
∣∣∣− sˆ(∣∣∣id2 − id1∣∣∣)∣∣∣ ≤ 2εdid jd(max). (11)
Note that the upper bound of such distance deviation
is equivalent to the width of an interval in (6), such that
2εdid,jd(max) = int
d
id(max) − intdid(min). (12)
Therefore, it is clear that an increase or reduction in
the width of each equal-width interval could signifi-
cantly affect the upper bound of such deviation. For
instance, when the number of intervals constructed over
a feature space is increased/reduced by a factor of b (i.e.
Sd ® bSd or Sd → 1
β
Sd ), the width of each equal-width
interval will be reduced/increased by the same factor.





Finally, when static bit allocation is adopted where an
equal number of equal-width intervals is constructed in
all D feature dimensions, the total distance deviation
incurred by the continuous-to-discrete mapping can be
upper bounded by 2Dεdid,jd(max) .
2.2 Discrete-to-binary mapping g(·)
The discrete-to-binary mapping can be defined in a
more direct manner compared to the previous map-
ping. Suppose that in the d-th dimension, we have Sd
discrete elements to be mapped from the index space.
We therefore require the same amount of elements in
the Hamming space to be mapped to. In fact, these
elements in the Hamming space (also known as the
codewords) may have different orders and indices
depending on the encoding scheme being employed.
With this, the direct-to-binary mapping can, therefore,
be specified by
bdid = g(i
d) =  (id) for id ∈ [0, Sd − 1] (13)
where ℂ(id) denotes a codeword with index id from an
encoding scheme ℂ. We shall look into the available
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options of ℂ and their individual effect on the discrete-
to-binary mapping in the following subsections.
2.2.1 Encoding schemes
(a) Direct binary representation (DBR)
In DBR, decimal indices are directly converted into
their binary equivalent. Depending on the required size
S of a code, the length of DBR is selected to be nDBR =
[log2 S]. A collection of DBRs in fulfilling S = 4, 8 and
16 are illustrated in Table 1.
(b) Binary reflected gray code (BRGC) [17]
BRGC is a special code that restricts the Hamming
distance between every consecutive pair of codewords to
unity. Similarly as DBR, each decimal index is uniquely
mapped to one out of S number of nBRGC-bit code-
words, where nBRGC = [log2 S]. If LnBRGC denotes the
listing of nBRGC-bit binary strings, then nBRGC-bit BRGC
can be defined recursively as follows:
L1 = 0.1
LnBRGC = 0LnBRGC−1,1LnBRGC−1 for nBRGC > 1
(14)
Here, bL denotes the list constructed from L by add-
ing bit b in front of every element of L, and L¯ denotes
the complement of list L. In Table 2, instances of
BRGCs in meeting different values of S are shown.
(c) Linearly separable subcode (LSSC) [20]
Out of 2nLSSC codewords in total for any positive
integer nLSSC, LSSC contains (nLSSC + 1) number of
nLSSC-bit codewords, where every adjacent pair of
codewords differs by a single bit and every non-adja-
cent pair of codewords differs by q bits, with q denot-
ing the corresponding index difference. Beginning
with an initial codeword, say the all-zero codeword,
the next nLSSC number of codewords can simply be
constructed by complementing a bit from the lowest
order (rightmost) bit position to the highest order
(leftmost) bit position one at a time. The resultant
nLSSC -bit LSSCs in fulfilling S = 4, 8 and 16 are
shown in Table 3.
2.2.2 Mappings and correspondences
On Hamming space where Hamming distance is crucial,
a one-to-one correspondence between each binary code-
word and the corresponding Hamming distance
incurred with respect to any reference codeword is
essentially desired. We can observe clearly from Figure
2 that even though the widely used DBR and BRGC
have each of their codewords associated with a unique
index, most mapped elements eventually overlap each
other as far as Hamming distance is concerned. In other
words, although distance deviation in prior continuous-
to-discrete mapping is minimal, the deviation effect led
by such an overlapping discrete-to-binary mapping
could be tremendous, causing the continuous feature
elements originated from multiple different non-adjacent
intervals to be mapped to a common Hamming distance
away from a specific codeword.
Taking DBR as an instance in Figure 2a, feature ele-
ments associated with intervals 1, 2 and 4 are mapped
to codewords ‘001’, ‘010’ and ‘100’, respectively, which
are all 1 Hamming distance away from ‘000’ (interval 0).
This implies that if there is a scenario where we have a
genuine template feature captured by interval 0, a genu-
ine query feature by interval 1, two imposters’ query fea-
tures by intervals 2 and 4, all query features will be
mapped to 1 Hamming distance away from the template
Table 1 A collection of nDBR-bit DBRs for S = 4, 8 and 16







[0] 00 [0] 000 [0] 0000 [8] 1000
[1] 01 [1] 001 [1] 0001 [9] 1001
[2] 10 [2] 010 [2] 0010 [10] 1010
[3] 11 [3] 011 [3] 0011 [11] 1011
[4] 100 [4] 0100 [12] 1100
[5] 101 [5] 0101 [13] 1101
[6] 110 [6] 0110 [14] 1110
[7] 111 [7] 0111 [15] 1111
Table 2 A collection of nBRGC-bit BRGCs for S = 4, 8 and







[0] 00 [0] 000 [0] 0000 [8] 1100
[1] 01 [1] 001 [1] 0001 [9] 1101
[2] 11 [2] 011 [2] 0011 [10] 1111
[3] 10 [3] 010 [3] 0010 [11] 1110
[4] 110 [4] 0110 [12] 1010
[5] 111 [5] 0111 [13] 1011
[6] 101 [6] 0101 [14] 1001
[7] 100 [7] 0100 [15] 1000
Table 3 A collection of nLSSC-bit LSSCs for S = 4,8 and 16








[0] 000 [0] 0000000 [0] 000000000000000 [8] 000000011111111
[1] 001 [1] 0000001 [1] 000000000000001 [9] 000000111111111
[2] 011 [2] 0000011 [2] 000000000000011 [10] 000001111111111
[3] 111 [3] 0000111 [3] 000000000000111 [11] 000011111111111
[4] 0001111 [4] 000000000001111 [12] 000111111111111
[5] 0011111 [5] 000000000011111 [13] 001111111111111
[6] 0111111 [6] 000000000111111 [14] 011111111111111
[7] 1111111 [7] 000000001111111 [15] 111111111111111
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and could not be differentiated. Likewise, the same pro-
blem occurs when BRGC is employed, as illustrated in
Figure 2b. Therefore, these imprecise mappings caused
by DBR and BRGC greatly undermine the actual discri-
minability of the feature elements and could probably
be detrimental to the overall recognition performance.
In contrast, LSSC does not suffer from such a draw-
back. As shown in Figure 2c, LSSC links each of its
codewords to a unique Hamming distance away from
any reference codeword in a decent manner. More pre-
cisely, a definite mapping behaviour can be obtained
when each index is mapped to a LSSC codeword. The
probability mass distribution in the discrete space is
completely preserved upon the discrete-to-binary map-
ping and thus, a precise mapping from the L1 distance
to the Hamming distance can be expected, such that















respective LSSC-based binary outputs∣∣∣ id1 − id2∣∣∣ = HD (bdid1 , bdid2
)
∀id1, id2 ∈ [0, Sd − 1],
∣∣∣ id1 − id2∣∣∣ = HD (bdid1 , bdid2
)
∀id1, id2 ∈ [0, Sd − 1] (15)
where HD denotes the Hamming distance operator.
The only disadvantage of LSSC is the larger bit length
requirement a system may need to afford in meeting a
similar number of discretization outputs compared to
DBR and BRGC. In the case where a total of Sd intervals
need to be constructed for each dimension, LSSC intro-
duces Rd = Sd - log2 S
d - 1 redundant bits to maintain
the optimal one-to-one discrete-to-binary mapping in
the d-th dimension. Thus, upon concatenation of
outputs from all feature dimensions, the length of
LSSC-based final binary string could be significantly
larger.
2.3 Combinations of both mappings
Through combining both continuous-to-discrete and





















vdid ,jd − sˆdtˆ − εdid,jd
))






sˆdtˆ − vdid,jd − εdid,jd
))





int dSd−1(max) − int d0(min)
Sd
and tˆd = 0.5 .
This equation can typically be used to derive the code-
word bdid based on the continuous feature value v
d
idjd .
In view of different encoding options, three discretiza-
tion configurations can be deduced. They are:
• Equal Width + Direct Binary Representation (EW
+ DBR)
• Equal Width + Binary Reflected Gray Code (EW +
BRGC)
• Equal Width + Linearly Separable SubCode (EW +
LSSC)
Table 4 gives a glance of the behaviours of both map-
pings which we have discussed so far. Among them, a
much poorer performance by EW + DBR and EW +
BRGC can be anticipated due to intrinsic indefinite
mapping deficiency. On contrary, only the combination
Figure 2 Discrete-to-binary mapping by different encoding techniques: (a) direct binary representation, (b) binary reflected gray code and
(c) linearly separable subcode.
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of EW + LSSC could lead to approximate and definite









∣∣ id2 − id1∣∣ and Sd = ndLSSC + 1 , integrating



























int dSd−1(max) − int d0(min)
∣∣∣vdid2 ,jd2 − vdid1 ,jd1
∣∣∣ .
(17)
Here the RHS of (17) corresponds to a rescaled L1
distance.
By concatenating distances of all D individual dimen-
sions, the overall discretization performance of EW +
LSSC could, therefore, very likely to resemble the rela-













int dSd−1(max) − int d0(min)
∣∣∣vdid2 ,jd2 − vdid1 ,jd1
∣∣∣ . (18)
Hence, matching plain bitstrings in a biometric verifi-
cation system guarantees a rescaled L1 distance-based
classification performance when Sd = ndLSSC + 1 is ade-
quately large. However, for cryptographic key generation
applications where a bitstring is derived directly from
the helper data of each user for further cryptographic
usage, (18) then implies relation between the bit discre-
pancy of an identity’s bitstring with reference to the
template bitstring and the L1 distance of their continu-
ous counterparts in each dimension.
3. Performance resemblances
When binary matching is performed, the basic resem-
blance in (18) can further be exploited to obtain resem-
blance with the other distance metric-based and
machine learning-based classification performance. The
key idea for such extension lies in how to flexibly alter
the matching function or to represent each continuous
feature element individually with its binary approxima-
tion in obtaining near-equivalent classification behaviour
in the continuous domain. As such, rather than just
confining binary matching method to pure Hamming
distance calculation, these extensions significantly
broaden the practicality of performing binary matching
and enable a strong performance resemblance of a
powerful classifier such as a multilayer perceptron
(MLP) [21] or a SVM [22] when the bits allocation to
each dimension is substantially large. In this section, ‘ζj’
denotes the matching score of the ‘j’ dissimilarity/simi-
larity measure.
3.1 Lp Distance metrics
In the case where a Lp distance metric classification
performance is desired, the resemblance equation in
(18) can easily be modified and applied to obtain an




























provided that the number of bits allocated to each
dimension are substantially large, or equivalently, the
quantization intervals in each dimension are of great
Table 4 A summary of mapping behavior of f(·) and g(·)
Continuous-to-discrete f(·) Discrete-to-binary g(·)









∣∣∣ ∼= sˆ (∣∣ id2 − id1∣∣ )
DBR Indefinite(∣∣ id2 − id1∣∣ = HD (bdid2 , bdid1
))
BRGC Indefinite(∣∣ id2 − id1∣∣ = HD (bdid2 , bdid1
))
LSSC Definite(∣∣ id2 − id1∣∣ = HD (bdid2 , bdid1
))
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∣∣∣ can be linked to the
desired distance computation, (14) can then be modified
and applied directly. According to (11), the total differ-











Likewise, to achieve a resembled performance of k-NN
classifier [23] and RBF network [24] that use Euclidean
distance (L2) as the distance metric, the RHS of (19)
can simply be amended and subsequently adopted for
binary matching by setting p = 2.
3.2 Inner product
For the inner product similarity measure which cannot
be directly associated with
∣∣∣vdi2 ,j2 − vdi1 ,j1
∣∣∣ , the simplest
way to obtain the approximate performance resem-
blance is to transform each continuous feature value
into its binary approximate individually and substitute it
into the actual formula. By exploiting results from (3),
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leading to an approximate binary representation of the
continuous feature value.
Considering inner product (IP) between two column
feature vectors ν1 and ν2 as an instance, we represent
every continuous feature element in each feature vector


























































For another instance, the similarity measure adopted
by SVM [22] in classifying an unknown data point
appears likewise to be inner product-based. Let ns be
the number of support vectors, yk = ± 1 be the class
label of the k-th support vector, vk be the k-th D-
dimensional support (column) vector, v be the D-dimen-
sional query (column) vector, λˆk be the optimized
Lagrange multiplier of the k-th support vector and wˆo
be the optimized bias. The performance resemblance of
binary SVM to that of the continuous counterpart fol-


















































The expected upper bound of the total difference in
similarity of (22) is then quantified by
maxyk
∣∣∣∣∑nykk=1∑Dd=1 yk (εdid2 ,jd2(max)
)2∣∣∣∣ where yk = ± 1 and
nyk denotes the number of support vectors with class
label yk.
In fact, the individual element transformation illu-
strated in (20) can be generalized to any other inner
product-based measure and classifier such as Pearson
correlation [25] and MLP [21] in order to obtain a
resemblance in performance when the matching is car-
ried out in the Hamming domain.
4. Performance evaluation
4.1 Data sets and experiment settings
To evaluate the discretization performance of the three
discretization schemes (EW + DBR, EW + BRGC and
EW + LSSC) and to justify the performance resem-
blances by EW + LSSC in particular, our experiments
were conducted based on the following two popular face
data sets:
AR
The employed data set is a random subset of the AR face
data set [26], which contains a total of 684 images corre-
sponding to 114 identities with 6 images per person. The
images were taken under controlled illumination condi-
tions with moderate variations in facial expressions. The
images were aligned according to standard landmarks,
such as eyes, nose and mouth. Each extracted raw feature
vector consists of 56 × 46 grey pixel elements. Histogram
equalization was applied to these images before they
were processed by the feature extractor.
FERET
The employed data set is a random subset of the FERET
face dataset, [27] in which the images were collected
under a semi-controlled environment. It contains a total
of 2400 images with 12 images for each of 200 identi-
ties. Proper alignment is applied to the images based on
the standard face landmarks. Due to possible strong var-
iation in hair style, only the face region is extracted for
recognition by cropping it to the size of 61 × 73 from
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each raw image. The images were pre-processed with
histogram equalization before feature extraction. Note
that SVM performance resemblance experiments in Fig-
ures 3Ib, IIb and 4Ib, IIb only utilize images from the
first 75 identities to reduce the computational complex-
ity of our experiments.
For each identity in both datasets, half of the images
are randomly selected for training while the remaining
half is used for testing. In order to measure the false
acceptance rate (FAR) of the system, each image of
every identity is matched against a random image of
every other identity within the testing partition (without
overlapping selection), while for evaluating the system
FRR, each image is matched against every other images
of the same identity for every identity within the testing
partition. In the following experiments, the equal error
rate (EER) (error rate where FAR = FRR) is used to
compare the classification and discretization perfor-
mances, since it is a quick and convenient way to com-
pare the accuracy of such classification and
discretization. The lower the EER is, the better the per-
formance is considered to be and vice versa.
4.2 Performance assessment
The conducted experiments can be categorized into two
parts. The first part examines the performance superior-
ity of EW + LSSC over the remaining schemes and jus-
tifies the fundamental performance resemblance with
the rescaled L1 distance-based classification perfor-
mance in (18). The second part vindicates the applic-
ability of EW + LSSC discretization in obtaining a
resembled performance of each different metric and a
classifier including L1, L2, L3 distance metric, inner pro-
duct similarity metric and a SVM classifier, as exhibited
in (19) and (21). Note that in this part, features from
each dimension have been min-max normalized (by
dividing both sides of (19) and (21) by(
int dSd−1(max) − int d0(min)
)
before they are classified/
discretized.
Both parts of experiments were carried out based on
static bit allocation. To ensure consistency of the results,
two different dimensionality reduction techniques (prin-
cipal component analysis (PCA) [28] and Eigenfeature
regularization and extraction (ERE) [29]) with two well-
known face data sets (AR and FERET) were used. The
raw dimensions of AR (2576) and FERET (4453) images
were both reduced to D = 64 by PCA and ERE in all
parts of experiment.
In general, discretization based on static bit allocation
assigns n bits equally to each of the D feature dimen-
sions, thereby yielding a Dn-bit binary string in repre-
senting every identity upon concatenating short binary
outputs from all individual dimensions. Note that LSSC
has a code length different from DBR and BRGC when
labelling a specific number of intervals. Thus, it is unfair
to compare the performance of EW + LSSC with the
remaining schemes through equalizing the bit length of
the binary strings generated by different encoding
schemes, since the dimensions utilized by LSSC-based
discretization will be much lesser than that by DBR-
based and BRGC-based discretization at common bit
lengths.
A better way to compare these discretization schemes
would be in terms of entropy L of the final bit string. By
denoting the entropy of the d-th dimension as ld and













Note that due to static bit allocation, Sd = S for all d.
Since Sd = 2n for BRGC & DBR while S = nLSSC + 1 for



















id for LSSC encoding based discretization
(24)
Figure 3 illustrates the EER and the ROC perfor-
mances of equal-width based discretization and the per-
formance resemblances of EW+LSSC discretization
based on the AR face data set. As depicted in Figure
3Ia, IIa for experiments on PCA- and ERE-extracted fea-
tures, EW + DBR and EW + BRGC discretizations fail
to preserve the distances in the index space and there-
fore deteriorate critically as the number of quantization
intervals constructed in each dimension increases, or
nearly proportionally, as the entropy L increases. EW +
LSSC, on the other hand, achieves not only definite, but
also the lowest discretization performance among the
discretization schemes especially at high L due to its
capability in preserving approximately the rescaled L1
distance-based classification performance.
Another noteworthy observation is that the initially
large deviation of EW + LSSC performance from the
rescaled L1 distance-based performance tends to
decrease as L increases at first and fluctuates trivially
after a certain point of L. This can be explained by (6)
that since for each dimension, the difference between
each continuous value with the central point of the
interval (to which we have chosen to scale the discreti-





. To augment the entropy L pro-
duced by a discretization scheme, the number of inter-
vals/possible outputs from each dimension needs to be
increased. As a result, a greatly reduced upper bound of
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(Ia) EER Plot (Ia) ROC Plot at ܮ ൌ ͵ͶͻǤͲ͹
(Ib) EER Plot (Ib) ROC Plot at ܮ ൌ ͵ͶͻǤͲ͹
(IIa) EER Plot (IIa) ROC Plot at ܮ ൌ ͵ͷͳǤ͸ʹ
(IIb) EER Plot (IIb) ROC Plot at ܮ ൌ ͵ͷͳǤͷͳ
Figure 3 Results on AR data set for (I) PCA and (II) ERE experiments: (a) EER and ROC performances of EW + DBR, EW + BRGC and EW
+ LSSC discretizations; and the rescaled L1 distance-based classification; and (b) the performance resemblances of applying EW +
LSSC. (C) and (H) denote the performance evaluation in the continuous and the Hamming domains, respectively. Classification performance
evaluated in the continuous domain is irrespective to the entropy. ‘[a]’ associated with each reading in the EER plots indicates the
corresponding length a of the extracted binary strings.
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(Ia) EER Plot (Ia) ROC Plot at ܮ ൌ ͵͵ͺǤ͹͹
(Ib) EER Plot (Ib) ROC Plot at ܮ ൌ ͵Ͷ͸Ǥ͸͹
(IIa) EER Plot (IIa) ROC Plot at ܮ ൌ ͵ͶͲǤ͵ͳ
(IIb) EER Plot (IIb) ROC Plot at ܮ ൌ ͵ͷͳǤͺ͹
Figure 4 Results on FERET data set for (I) PCA and (II) ERE experiments: (a) EER and ROC performances of EW + DBR, EW + BRGC and
EW + LSSC discretizations; and the rescaled L1 distance-based classification; and (b) the performance resemblances of applying EW +
LSSC. (C) and (H) denote the performance evaluation in the continuous and the Hamming domains respectively. Classification performance
evaluated in the continuous domain is irrespective to the entropy. ‘[a]’ associated with each reading in the EER plots indicates the
corresponding length a of the extracted binary strings.
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the overall deviation 2D εdid ,jd(max) can eventually be
obtained. Therefore, the more the number of intervals is
constructed for each dimension, or in other words the
higher the overall entropy is desired, the stronger the
resemblances will be observed to be. Note that similar
observations in Figure 3Ia, IIa illustrate the indepen-
dence of the resemblances with respect to the feature
extraction methods employed.
Perhaps the only limitation arose in achieving such
performance resemblances is the inevitable derivation of
large length binary string per user when high entropy
strength is desired by a system. As shown in Figure 3Ia,
IIa, bitstring that is at least four times longer than the
entropy is needed to offer 222- and 224-bit entropy
respectively, while bit string that is at least six times
longer is required to fulfil a 285- and 288-bit system-
specific entropy respectively. Indeed, these amounts of
binary bits pose high processing challenges to the sys-
tem capability. However, with the current state of tech-
nology advancement, it is expected that processing these
binary strings would not raise so much of a critical
threat to the current systems.
For performance resemblance experiments on PCA-
and ERE-extracted features in Figure 3Ib, IIb, the ten-
dency of the performance resemblances are similar to
the previous case where the difference of EER perfor-
mance in the continuous and the Hamming domains is
noticeable at low L and an approximate performance
resemblance can be noticed when L ≥ 159.2 in Figure
3Ib and L ≥ 161.7 in Figure 3IIb. Therefore, similar
explanations applied.
Similar performance trends can be seen in Figure 4
when FERET data set was used. Note that when L
increases, EW + DBR and EW + BRGC remain deterior-
ating badly, as shown in Figure 4Ia, IIa. Their deficit of
being indefinite during the discrete-to-binary mapping
process can again be justified. Contrarily, the perfor-
mance of the EW + LSSC discretization remains the
lowest and it resembles nearly exactly the rescaled L1
distance-based performance when L ≥ 338.77 in Figure
4Ia and L ≥ 276.52 in Figure 4IIa. In Figure 4Ib, IIb, the
initial performance deviation between each pair of
schemes is slightly lower as those in Figure 4Ib, IIb,
although perfect resemblance can similarly be observed
at high L.
4.3 Summary and discussions
By and large, our general findings can be summarized in
the following three aspects:
• When substantial quantization intervals are con-
structed or a large number of bits are allocated to each
feature dimension, equal width (EW) quantization offers
an approximate continuous-to-discrete mapping. LSSC
outperforms DBR and BRGC in preserving a definite
discrete-to-binary mapping behaviour. Overall, adopting
equal width quantization with LSSC as a discretizer
results in an approximate outcome.
• As long as EW+LSSC is concerned, the distance
between two mapped elements in the Hamming domain
is fundamentally associated to an approximately rescaled
L1 distance between the two continuous counterparts.
• The basic performance resemblance of EW + LSSC
discretization to L1 distance-based classification can be
extended to Lp distance-based and inner product-based
classifications either by flexibly modifying the matching
function or by substituting every continuous feature ele-
ment individually with its binary approximate to obtain
a similar classification behaviour in the continuous
domain.
We believe that the clarification of the underlying
mapping behaviours of EW + LSSC discretization would
benefit not only the cryptographic and biometric com-
munities, but also communities from machine learning
and data mining areas (i.e. relevant applications include
image retrieval [30], image categorization [31], text cate-
gorization [32] and etc). In fact, EW + LSSC discretiza-
tion can be appropriately adopted in any other
application that requires transformation from continu-
ous data to binary bitsrings and involves similarity/dis-
similarity matching in the Hamming domain so as to
attain a deterministically resembled performance of the
continuous counterpart.
5. Conclusion
Biometric discretization aims to facilitating numerous
security applications through deriving stable representa-
tive binary strings in practice. Therefore, understanding
the way which discretization may influence on the clas-
sification performance is important in warranting the
optimal classification performance when discretization is
performed. In this paper, we have decomposed equal-
width discretization into a two-stage mapping process
and performed detailed analysis in the continuous, dis-
crete and Hamming domains in view of different map-
ping associations among them. Our analysis yields that
equal-width quantization exhibits an approximate con-
tinuous-to-discrete mapping trend when sufficiently
many quantization intervals are constructed while LSSC
encoding scheme offers a definite discrete-to-binary
mapping behaviour. We have shown that the combina-
tion of both such quantization and encoding schemes
results in a discretization scheme which offers an
approximate rescaled L1 distance-based classification
performance in the Hamming metric. Further, we have
also illustrated how such a fundamental resemblance
can be exploited to obtain other approximate classifica-
tion performances when binary matching is concerned.
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These analysis outcomes have been experimentally sup-
ported and the performance resemblances which we
have shown are neither dependent to the feature extrac-
tion technique (PCA and ERE) nor the dataset (AR and
FERET).
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